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I. INTRODUCTION
"At bottom the case against Claus von Bilow was a scientific case.
It would have to be refuted by scientific evidence,"' wrote Alan Dersho-
witz. The von Bilow case is not alone. Many recent notorious criminal
trials involved scientific proof. For example, the prosecution offered
hypnotically refreshed testimony and bite mark evidence in the Ted
Bundy case.2 Fiber evidence proved critical in the trial of Wayne Wil-
liams for the murder of two of the thirty young black males killed in
Atlanta in the late 1970s.' Other illustrations include the pathology and
serology testimony in the Jean Harris trial, 4 the forensic analysis of
physical evidence in the Jeffrey MacDonald "Green Beret Doctor"
case,5 and the ballistics, shoeprint, and fingerprint evidence in the
"Night Stalker" serial murder prosecution.6 Indeed, reliance on scien-
tific proof has become so common that its absence in a particular case is
noteworthy. A news account of the "Central Park Jogger" case com-
mented that "[a]mong the defense's strongest points in attacking the
prosecution's case was the surprising absence of physical evidence-no
1. A. DERSHOWITZ, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: INSIDE THE VON BlLOW CASE 105 (1986); see also
State v. von Bilow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
2. See Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18-19 (Fla. 1985); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330, 342-43
(Fla. 1984); see also R. LARSEN, BUNDY: THE DELIBERATE STRANGER (1986); S. MICHAUD & H. AYNES-
WORTH, THE ONLY LIVING WITNESS (1983).
3. See Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983); see also Deadman, Fiber Evi-
dence and the Wayne Williams Trial (Conclusion), 53 F.B.I. LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10 (May
1984) [hereinafter Deadman, Fiber Evidence]; Deadman, Fiber Evidence and the Wayne Williams
Trial (pt 1), 53 F.B.I. LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 12 (Mar. 1984) [hereinafter Deadman, Wayne Wil-
liams Trial].
4. See People v. Harris, 84 A.D.2d 63, 445 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 442
N.E.2d 1205, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983). Eight pathologists testi-
fied and 20% of the trial was devoted to cutaneous histology. See Ackerman, The Physician As
Expert Witness: Is Peer Review Needed?, 1 GENERICS 37, 52 (Dec. 1985) (stating that "[t]he role of
cutaneous histology in the trial of Jean Harris and its implications for medicine and the law in
America should be of concern to the community of physicians"); Beach, Mr. Wizard Comes to
Court, TIME, Mar. 1, 1982, at 90 (reporting that "[a]t the trial of Jean Harris last year [the expert]
tried to persuade the jury-unsuccessfully-that blood marks jibed with Harris's claim that the
shooting of Dr. Herman Tarnower occurred accidentally during a struggle"); see also S. ALEXAN-
DER, VERY MUCH A LADY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF JEAN HARRIS AND DR. HERMAN TARNOWER (1983);
J. DAVID, SCARSDALE MURDER (1981).
5. MacDonald was convicted of killing his wife and two children. His story became the sub-
ject of a book and movie. See J. McGINNISS, FATAL VISION 264 (1983) (explaining that "[t]he physi-
cal evidence ...had from the start been at the core of the case against MacDonald"); see also
United States v. MacDonald, 779 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986);
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982); United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983); United States v. MacDonald, 640 F. Supp. 286
(D.N.C. 1985); United States v. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. 1183 (D.N.C. 1985).
6. See Harris, Night Stalker Convicted of 13 Murders, U.P.I., Sept. 21, 1989. The recent
high-publicity murder trial of Robert Golub on Long Island included DNA, bite mark, fingerprint,
and hair analysis evidence. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1990, at B2, col. 4. One newspaper headline read:
In L.L Murder Case, Focus Turns to Science, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1990, at 24.
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weapons, no blood stains, no strands of hair, no pieces of skin, no foot-
prints link any of the teenagers to the crimes." 7
Even the popular press has written on the subject. The New York
Times relates that the importance of expert testimony "is growing as
technological advances enable courts to dispose of cases by using scien-
tific tools."8 Time reports that "forensic science is growing so fast that
even the most sophisticated researchers cannot keep up."9
This development raises a number of issues for the legal system.
The standard for admitting novel scientific evidence, such as Deox-
yribonucleic Acid (DNA), continues to vex the courts.10 The admissibil-
ity of laboratory reports in criminal prosecutions is unresolved." The
contours of an indigent accused's right to defense experts still is being
explored. 2 The expansion of the bases of expert testimony in Federal
Rule of Evidence 703 (Rule 703) remains controversial. 3
One issue that appears to be settled is the need for pretrial discov-
ery of scientific evidence. Virtually all jurisdictions track Federal Crimi-
nal Rule 16 (Rule 16) and make reports of scientific tests discoverable. 4
7. Sherman, Technology, Emotion Key in Jogger Case, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20, 1990, at 8; see
also N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1990, at B4 (reporting that "[t]he youths claimed not to have penetrated
the jogger, and there was no clear physical proof that they had").
8. Jenkins, Experts' Day in Court, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983 (Magazine), at 98, 100.
9. Beach, supra note 4, at 90; see also Cherry, Their Blood Cried out for Vengeance, Sci.
DIG. 60 (May 1981) (stating that by "[ulsing a host of new techniques, forensic scientists are now
able to crack cases once considered unsolvable").
10. See Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 597 (1988);
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1198-99 (1980).
11. Compare United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353, 1359 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding lab reports
of drug analysis admissible under Federal Rules), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989) with Gian-
nelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of Scientific
Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1988) (arguing that lab reports should be inadmissible).
12. The United States Supreme Court first recognized an indigent's right to defense experts
in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The exact dimensions of the right, however, have not been
mapped out. See Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the "Ake
decision fails to establish a bright line test for determining when a defendant has demonstrated
that sanity at the time of the offense will be a significant factor at the time of trial"); Note, Expert
Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma,
84 MICH. L. REV. 1326 (1986).
13. See Carlson, Getting a Grip on Experts, 16 LITIGATION 36 (Summer 1990); Imwinkelried,
The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C.L.
REV. 1 (1988).
14. FED. R CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D) provides:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy
or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests
or experiments, or copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of the
government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become
known, to the attorney for the government, and which are material to the preparation of the
defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial.
Id.; see also P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 91 & n.23 (1986) (listing state
jurisdictions).
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The leading texts on criminal procedure give the subject scant atten-
tion, apparently assuming that the current discovery rules are ade-
quate. 15 Indeed, one commentator noted that the limited litigation over
Rule 16 "no doubt reflects the general recognition of the necessity to
afford the defense discovery of the results and reports of medical exam-
inations and scientific tests and of the longstanding and widespread
practice of many prosecutors of making such information available on
request."' 6
Recent cases, including those involving DNA evidence, however,
demonstrate the gross inadequacy of the current discovery rules. Rule
16 does not even guarantee defendants the most fundamental form of
discovery-notice that a prosecution expert is going to testify against
them at trial. When discovery is provided in the form of scientific re-
ports, it is insufficient for adequate trial preparation. In addition, some
courts still refuse to recognize an accused's right to test independently
the state's evidence. Moreover, instead of voluntary disclosure, vigorous
opposition to discovery often has been the prosecutorial response.
Part II of this Article explores more fully the need for pretrial dis-
covery. Parts III through VII then examine the deficiencies of the cur-
rent discovery rules in the areas of notice, scientific reports, related
documents, and evidence testing. The Conclusion sets out proposals for
reform.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Some background information on the use of scientific evidence in
criminal cases is helpful to elucidate particular deficiencies in the cur-
rent discovery rules. As noted above, resort to scientific methods of
proof is increasing.'1 In addition, the impact of this type of evidence is
substantial. One researcher reported that approximately twenty-five
percent of the jurors in trials involving scientific evidence stated that
they would have delivered a verdict of not guilty instead of guilty if the
evidence had not been introduced.'"
15. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3 (1984); J. MOORE, W. TAGGART
& J. WICKER, 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 16.05[2] (1990); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 254 (2d ed. 1982). The Author's treatment of the subject suffered from the same
assumption. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14, ch. 3.
16. Rezneck, Pretrial Discovery in the Federal Courts, in 1 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
10-31 (1990).
17. Judge Jack Weinstein has commented: "Hardly a case of importance is tried today in the
federal courts without the involvement of a number of expert witnesses." Weinstein, Improving
Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 473 (1986).
18. See Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, The Use and Effects of Forensic Science in
the Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SC. 1730, 1748 (1987); see also M. SAKS & R. VAN
[Vol. 44:791
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A. Reliability of Scientific Proof
Previous articles have discussed the reliability of scientific proof; 9
therefore, it is necessary to highlight only a few points here. As illus-
trated by several fingerprint cases, even the most basic techniques are
subject to error. In Imbler v. Craven,20 for example, the prosecution ex-
pert failed to observe an exculpatory fingerprint in a murder case in
which the death penalty was imposed. In another murder case, State v.
Caldwell,2' the court observed that the expert's fingerprint testimony
"was damning-and it was false. ' 22
These cases do not represent isolated mistakes. Proficiency test re-
sults of many common laboratory examinations are alarming. One of
the authors of a major proficiency test acknowledged that "a disturb-
ingly high percentage" of routine laboratory tests are not performed
competently.23 Seventy-one percent of the crime laboratories tested
provided unacceptable results in a blood test, 51.4% made errors in
matching paint samples, 35.5% erred in a soil examination, and 28.2%
made mistakes in firearms identifications.24 Similarly, a review of five
handwriting comparison proficiency tests showed that the document ex-
aminers at best were correct 57% of the time and were incorrect 43% of
the time. 5 Moreover, a limited, but nevertheless revealing, survey of
lawyers and scientists associated with the American Academy of Foren-
sic Sciences identified competency as the most significant ethical prob-
lem in forensic science.26 Other problems considered significant include
the failure of experts to express both the strengths and weaknesses of
DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 5-6 (1983) (relating that "[75 percent] of
the respondents to a 1974 survey of 1,363 judges and lawyers ... throughout the United States
stated that they believed judges accord scientific evidence more credibility than other evidence,
and 70 percent believed that juries also find scientific evidence more credible").
19. See generally Giannelli, supra note 10; Giannelli, supra note 11.
20. 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
865 (1970).
21. 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982).
22. Id. at 586; see also Starrs, A Miscue in Fingerprint Identification: Causes and Concerns,
12 J. POLICE SCL & ADMIN. 287 (1984).
23. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1984)
(remarks of Professor Joseph Peterson) [hereinafter Symposium on Science]. For a more detailed
discussion of proficiency testing, see Giannelli, supra note 11, at 688-92; Saks, Prevalence and
Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 772, 775-78 (1989) (reviewing
proficiency testing results and concluding that "[p]erhaps the major lessons to be drawn from this
are that errors are indeed made and that there is a wide range of interlaboratory variation").
24. J. PETERSON, E. FABRICANT & K. FIELD, CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RE-
SEARCH PROGRAM 251 (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Oct. 1978).
25. Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance As a Proxy for Rational Knowledge:
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 747-48 (1989).
26. Peterson & Murdock, Forensic Sciences Ethics: Developing an Integrated System of
Support and Enforcement, 34 J. FORENSIC ScI. 749, 751 (1989).
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their data, testimony that exceeds the limits of the data, and the failure
to remain objective in the evaluation of evidence and the delivery of
testimony.2
7
More important, institutional and systemic problems exist. Certifi-
cation standards for analysts and quality assurance programs for crime
laboratories generally are not required."' One scholar has commented,
""At present, forensic science is virtually unregulated-with the para-
doxical result that clinical laboratories must meet higher standards to
be allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to put
a defendant on death row."
29
DNA evidence, the most recent weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal,
is no exception. Heralded as "foolproof,"30 "revolutionary,"31 and the
"single greatest advance in the 'search for truth'. . . since the advent of
cross-examination," 32 many courts have found DNA evidence reliable
and admissible.33 Despite this judicial acceptance and favorable public-
ity, however, problems have surfaced. Cellmark, one of the commercial
laboratories conducting DNA analysis, admittedly made a false identifi-
cation in a proficiency test.3 4 In People v. Castro"5 the prosecution's
27. Id. at 752.
28. One commentator stated: "Crime laboratories are unique among publicly supported sci-
entific operations in that few participate in external quality assurance programs." Peterson, The
Crime Lab, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE 184, 196 (C. Klockars ed. 1983). Voluntary proficiency test-
ing programs and voluntary crime laboratory accreditation programs are becoming more common.
Peterson & Murdock, supra note 26, at 752-53.
29. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 (1989).
30. DNA Prints: A Foolproof Crime Test, TIME, Jan. 26, 1987, at 66.
31. Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes: A New Forensic Test Is Revolutionizing Criminal
Procedure, TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 74.
32. People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 308, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany County Ct. 1988).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CR0720 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990); Perry v. State,
(Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ala file); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990); People v. Thomas, 137
Ill. 2d 500, 561 N.E.2d 57 (1990); Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 559 A.2d 391, cert. denied, 317
Md. 542, 565 A.2d 670 (1989); State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990); State v.
Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1990); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Glover v.
State, 787 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d
775 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759 (1990); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989).
"First introduced into U.S. criminal proceedings in 1986, forensic DNA analysis has since been
admitted into evidence in at least 185 cases by 38 States and the U.S. military as of January 1,
1990." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 14
(1990) [hereinafter OTA GENETIC WITNESS]. But see United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th
Cir. 1990) (case was remanded to determine whether FBI laboratory DNA procedures were con-
ducted properly).
34. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989) (writing that "[w]e are troubled by
the fact that Cellmark admitted having 'falsely identified two samples as coming from the same
subject' during a proficiency test performed by the California Association of Crime Laboratory
Directors (CACLD) [, and that] [o]ut of 44 total samples, Cellmark made one incorrect match,
which was considered too high an error rate by some experts").
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own experts conceded that the DNA tests performed by Lifecodes, an-
other laboratory, were "not scientifically reliable enough to support the
assertion that the samples . . . do or do not match."36 In another case,
Cellmark and Lifecodes reached different conclusions after examining
the same evidence.3 7 Even the recent, and generally favorable, DNA re-
port by the Office of Technology Assessment recognizes that "[s]erious
questions are raised . . . about how best to ensure that any particular
test result is reliable." 8
Despite these problems, scientific evidence offers a number of ad-
vantages over other types of proof, such as confessions and eyewitness
identifications. Much of the expert evidence admitted at criminal trials
is valid, and many crime laboratories, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) laboratory, are proficient. Scientific evidence, how-
ever, has not reached the stage at which it should be considered pre-
sumptively valid. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the role of the
adversary system is to reveal and acknowledge the "shortcomings" of
expert testimony.3 9
B. Admissibility and the Adversary Process
At the same time that reliance on scientific evidence increased, the
barriers to the admissibility of expert testimony were lowered. Many
jurisdictions, for example, abandoned the conservative "general accept-
The OTA Report provides further details:
With respect to blind trials of forensic DNA testing in the United States, CACLD organ-
ized trials using case-simulated samples in 1987 and 1988. The three major commercial facili-
ties then performing forensic DNA analysis participated in each trial. In the first trial, out of
50 samples, 2 firms each declared 1 false match that could have resulted in the conviction of
an innocent person. The errors apparently arose from sample handling problems. The third
company declared no false matches. In the second trial, one company again reported an incor-
rect match.
OTA GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 33, at 79-80 (footnotes omitted).
35. 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
36. Lander, supra note 29, at 504.
37. Starrs, The Fallibility of Forensic DNA Testing: Of Proficiency in Public and Private
Laboratories (pt. 1), 14 Scl. SLEUTHING REV. 10 (Spring 1990) (reporting that "Cellmark shortly
determined that Lifecodes had made a significant measurement mistake in sizing the bands on the
autorads" (discussing People v. Irons, an Erie, Illinois murder case)); see also Starrs, The Fallibil-
ity of Forensic DNA Testing: Of Proficiency in Public and Private Laboratories (pt. 2), 14 ScI.
SLEUTHING REV. 12 (Fall 1990) (discussing two cases in which FBI analysts mistranscribed popula-
tion frequencies statistics in reporting DNA results).
38. OTA GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 33, at 83. The report goes on to identify several is-
sues: "These questions focus on data interpretation, how to minimize realistic human error, and
the appropriate level of monitoring to ensure quality. Such questions, which stem from actual
court cases, underscore the need to develop both technical and operational standards now." Id.
39. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to
the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony of future dangerousness in capital cases).
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ance" test espoused in Frye v. United States40 for determining the ad-
missibility of novel scientific proof.41 Similarly, the Federal Rules of
Evidence encourage the expanded use of expert testimony.42 Rule 703,
in particular, permits an expert to base an opinion on data not admit-
ted at trial if the data is of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the
field. Both Rule 703 and the less restrictive relevancy approach that has
been substituted for the Frye test depend on advance disclosure.43
Once expert testimony is admitted at trial, the defense typically
attacks the testimony through cross-examination and by the presenta-
tion of defense experts. Successful cross-examination of an expert, how-
ever, is a formidable undertaking. Attorneys rarely are as knowl-
edgeable as the expert. 4 The effectiveness of cross-examination de-
pends, in large measure, on thorough preparation. Similarly, the presen-
tation of defense experts requires advance planning-in short, adequate
pretrial discovery.
C. Pretrial Discovery
There is little dispute that pretrial discovery is necessary when us-
ing expert and scientific evidence.45 In this context at least, the tradi-
tional arguments against criminal discovery lose whatever force they
otherwise might have. Opponents have argued that criminal discovery
40. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1241 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v.
Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 251 (C.M.A. 1987); Santiago v. State, 510 A.2d 488, 489 (Del. 1987); State v.
Wheeler, 496 A.2d 1382, 1388 (R.I. 1985); see also P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14,
at 14 n.56 (listing cases rejecting Frye).
42. FED. R. EVID. 703; see also Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law Approach to
an Expert's Opinion About a Witness's Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV.
559, 559 (1989) (explaining that "Rules 702 through 705 sought to sweep away the restrictive
dogma that curtailed expert proof"'); Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules
of Evidence: Insuring the Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43 (assert-
ing that "[tien years after the revolution in expert witness testimony, the legal community has not
yet fully appreciated the true impact of the new approach and attitude of the Federal Rules of
Evidence on trial practice").
43. See FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee note (emphasizing the importance of discov-
ery); Giannelli, supra note 10, at 1245 (arguing that "[p]rovisions for notice, full discovery, the
opportunity to re-examine evidence, and the appointment of defense experts are critical compo-
nents of the relevancy approach").
44. United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Md. 1973); see also Rezneck, The New
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1276, 1278 (1966) (arguing that "expert wit-
nesses are almost impossible to cross-examine and expert testimony almost impossible to rebut
without intensive pretrial preparation").
45. The American Bar Association Standards comment that "[tihe need for full and fair dis-
closure is especially apparent with respect to scientific proof and the testimony of experts." ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 66 (Approved Draft 1970) [here-
inafter ABA STANDARDS].
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will encourage perjury, will lead to the intimidation of witnesses, and
because of the fifth amendment, will be a one-way exchange.46 The first
argument fails because scientific and expert evidence is virtually impos-
sible to distort or misuse even though it is disclosed in advance of the
trial.47 Additionally, there is no proof that experts have been intimi-
dated, probably because the expert's evidence could be retested or an-
other expert could testify about the examination. 4 Finally, the self-
incrimination clause as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court
presents little impediment to the prosecution's discovery of scientific
proof.4
9
Extensive defense discovery of scientific evidence also eliminates
due process concerns.50 As the Supreme Court has noted, due process
"speak[s] to the balance of forces between the accused and his ac-
cuser."51 Over three hundred crime laboratories operate in this country,
eighty percent of which are under the control of the police,52 and most
laboratories examine only evidence submitted by law enforcement agen-
cies.53 In contrast, criminal defendants, who typically are indigent, do
46. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 252, at 36-37.
47. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 45, at 67.
48. See 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 19.3, at 732 (taking the position that
"[o]nce the report is prepared, the scientific expert's position is not readily influenced, and there-
fore disclosure presents little danger of prompting perjury or intimidation").
49. For a discussion of the fifth amendment issues concerning prosecutorial discovery, see
infra note 205 and accompanying text.
50. According to the Supreme Court, "[tihere is no general constitutional right to discovery
in a criminal case." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). The Court, however, has
recognized a limited due process right to the disclosure of exculpatory and material evidence under
certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), a plurality of the Court reaffirmed this posi-
tion. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, who cast the deciding vote, indicated that the
confrontation clause as well as due process applied to criminal discovery. Justice Blackmun stated:
"In my view, there might well be a confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied pre-
trial access to information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a crucial prose-
cution witness." Id. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed
with this analysis, while Justices Stevens and Scalia dissented on procedural grounds.
51. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); see also Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (stating that the "adversary system presupposes [that] accurate and
just results are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests"); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (explaining that " '[d]ue process' emphasizes fairness between the
State and the individual dealing with the State").
52. Peterson, Mihajlovic & Bedrosian, The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation's
Criminalistics Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC Sci. 10, 11 (1985) (stating that "[s]eventy-nine percent
of all [257 out of 319] laboratories responding to our survey are located within law enforcement!
public safety agencies").
53. Id. at 13 (explaining that "[flifty-seven percent. . . would only examine evidence sub-
mitted by law enforcement officials"); see also FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HANDBOOK OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE 7 (rev. ed. 1984) (stating that FBI lab services are available only to duly consti-
tuted state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies).
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not have access to such resources. Thus, it is unsurprising that a com-
mentator predicted that the disparity of investigative resources between
the defense and the prosecution "is likely to have its maximum impact
in the presentation of evidence which must be analyzed and developed
in the laboratory or hospital. '54
In summary, while a substantial number of errors continue to be
made in forensic examinations, resort to scientific proof has increased.
The evidentiary rules on expert testimony also have been relaxed.
Thus, the argument for pretrial discovery in this context is powerful,
and the arguments against discovery are virtually nonexistent.
III. NOTICE
The most basic discovery need concerning scientific evidence is ad-
vance knowledge that an expert will testify at trial. Many jurisdictions,
including the federal courts, do not require the prosecution to provide a
list of witnesses that it intends to call at trial;55 nor are discovery depo-
sitions generally permitted in criminal cases.5 6 Nevertheless, statutes
and rules typically allow discovery of scientific reports, and the exis-
tence of such a report provides notice that an expert may be called to
testify. The problem, however, is that the absence of a report does not
necessarily mean that a prosecution expert will not testify. A rather
simple reason explains this result: nothing in Rule 16 requires that a
report be made, or if one is made, that it be written, even if a scientific
test is performed.5
54. Rezneck, supra note 44, at 1278; see also State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 567, 206 A.2d 359,
363 (1965) (arguing that pretrial discovery "lessen[s] the imbalance which may result from the
State's early and complete investigation in contrast to [the defendant's] ... late and limited
investigation").
55. See United States v. Holland, 884 F.2d 354, 357 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that Rule 16
does not require disclosure of prospective witnesses, including experts), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 552
(1989); United States v. Taylor, 707 F. Supp. 696, 702-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that a witness
list, including expert witnesses, is not discoverable). In 1974 Congress rejected a proposed rule to
require discovery of witness lists. 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 19.3, at 493.
56. Most jurisdictions allow depositions only to preserve the testimony of witnesses who may
be unavailable for trial. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); IDAHO CODE § 19-
3102 (1987); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.10. A few jurisdictions, however, do permit discovery depositions.
See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM P. 15(a); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-3 (West
1986); VT. R. CraM. P. 15(a).
57. As a matter of practice most crime laboratories prepare reports. One commentator has
written:
An additional practice of some laboratories merits discussion. This practice is that of
examiners not writing results in official report form unless they are informed by the prosecu-
tor that the case is going to trial. The principal justification for this procedure is the high
volume of cases to be analyzed and the time required to prepare written case reports. The
argument is made, "What is the point in taking the time to prepare an official report if the
case may be dismissed or may result in a guilty plea?" To allow the prosecutor discretion over
what laboratory examinations appear in report form puts the defendant at a distinct
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Oral reports are not discoverable under Rule 16. As a result, the
defendant in United States v. Shue5 8 was not entitled to the verbal
report of an FBI photographic expert who compared pictures of Shue
with those of a bank robber. Unbeknown to the defense, the expert
made the comparison the night before he testified. Similarly, a police
officer in United States v. Johnson59 testified as an emergency medical
technician without notice to the defense. Although the defense argued
that the testimony was highly prejudicial because it contradicted an im-
portant aspect of the defense case, the Eleventh Circuit merely noted
that there is no right to a witness list and that Rule 16 was not impli-
cated because "no ...reports were made in th[e] case."60
The Wayne Williams prosecution provides another illustration."
The trial turned on fiber evidence, which constituted an "essential
part" of the case according to the FBI expert who testified for the pros-
ecution."' This evidence was critical for two reasons: It connected Wil-
liams with the crime scenes of the two homicides for which he was
charged; and perhaps more important, it connected him with ten other
murders, evidence of which was introduced as "other acts" evidence.
One of the prosecution's three fiber experts was Barry Gaudette, who
worked for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He examined fiber and
hair samples for eleven days and then testified from personal notes.
Gaudette, however, had not prepared a written report. Thus, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court ruled that the defense was not entitled to discov-
ery." The dissent replied:
By allowing an expert to forgo delivery of a full written report and to later testify
orally where, as here, he had ample time to prepare such a written report and con-
ducted tests too complex to remember unaided, we permit ever more egregious in-
justice and violation of the intent [of the discovery statute], which is to put into
the defendant's hands these reports with sufficient time before trial to enable him
to check and challenge their content.""
disadvantage.
Peterson, Ethical Issues in the Collection, Examination, and Use of Physical Evidence, in FOREN-
SIC SCIENCE 35, 41 (G. Davies ed. 1986).
58. 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987).
59. 713 F.2d 654 (lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1030 (1984).
60. 713 F.2d at 659; see also United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 795 (3d Cir. 1987)
(noting but not deciding the issue of whether oral reports are discoverable under Rule 16), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 988 (1988); United States v. Glaze, 643 F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 1981) (the unwrit-
ten results of a field test for drugs were not disclosed).
61. See Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983).
62. Deadman, Wayne Williams Trial, supra note 3, at 13.
63. Williams, 251 Ga. at 753, 312 S.E.2d at 50; see also Law v. State, 251 Ga. 525, 528, 307
S.E.2d 904, 906-07 (1983) (stating that the discovery statute applies only to written, not oral,
reports).
64. Williams, 251 Ga. at 827, 312 S.E.2d at 100 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith also
dissented in another case that raised the issue. He stated:
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Significantly, another major issue on appeal was an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim for failure to challenge more vigorously the relia-
bility of the fiber analysis.65 This allegation is not surprising. Scientific
evidence generally, and the fiber evidence in Williams especially, pre-
sent enormously difficult problems for defense counsel. While not a
panacea, extensive discovery would reduce significantly these difficulties
by giving defense counsel the information needed for adequate
preparation.
When Rule 16(a)(1)(D) was drafted in 1966, most scientific evi-
dence consisted of autopsy reports and crime laboratory reports for the
examination of drugs, fingerprints, firearms identifications, and hand-
writing.6  Today experts have developed many new categories of scien-
tific evidence. Examples include expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome,67 child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, 68 battered
woman syndrome,6 9 and bite mark comparisons. 70 Neither custom nor
regulation requires these experts to write reports. Indeed, as the above
It is an insult to intelligent people to say that a scientific test was conducted from which
absolutely no notes or records survive. Unless of course the omission was deliberate.
A basic principle of scientific testing is that careful records of test procedure and results
are to be scrupulously maintained. A scientific test without an accompanying report of the
testing environment, number of trials, raw results and analyzed data is in reality no test at all.
Law, 251 Ga. at 530, 307 S.E.2d at 908 (Smith, J., dissenting).
65. The dissent in Williams wrote:
Related to the above ineffectiveness of defense counsel was their failure to challenge the
scientific reliability of the principles and techniques used by the state's experts in conducting
their fiber comparisons. . . . This challenge was crucial to an adequate defense to the fiber
evidence, and its omission demonstrates inadequate preparation ....
Williams, 251 Ga. at 829, 312 S.E.2d at 101 (Smith, J., dissenting).
66. See Rezneck, supra note 44, at 1278.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Peel, 29 M.J. 235, 241 (C.M.A. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
731 (1990); State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 4-6 (Iowa 1989); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293,
552 N.E.2d 131, 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 890'(1990). See generally P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 14, § 9.8.
68. See, e.g., United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1987); State v. Hall, 406
N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 1987); State v. Geyman, 224 Mont. 194, 729 P.2d 475, 479 (1986); see also
McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecu-
tions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 1 (1986).
69. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 387-88 (Ky. 1990); State v. Koss, 49
Ohio St. 3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (Vernon 1989 Supp.). See gener-
ally P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14, § 9.6.
70. See, e.g., Handley v. State, 515 So. 2d 121, 129-31 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Commonwealth
v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 569-72, 492 N.E.2d 357, 363-64 (1986); People v. Marsh, 177 Mich. App.
161, 167, 441 N.W.2d 33, 36 (1989). See generally P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14,
ch. 13; Eads, Adjudication by Ambush: Federal Prosecutors' Use of Nonscientific Experts in a
System of Limited Discovery, 67 N.C.L. REv. 577 (1989) (listing other types of "nonscientific"
experts).
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cases illustrate, the prosecution loses the element of surprise by prepar-
ing a report.7 1
Requiring the production of witness lists does not guarantee ade-
quate notice of prospective expert witnesses. In State v. Caulder,7 2 a
child sexual abuse case, the prosecution produced a witness list as re-
quired by a discovery rule.7 3 The name of a social worker was on the
list. The list did not reveal, however, that this witness would testify as
an expert on child sexual abuse. At trial the defense counsel objected
and moved for a continuance because he was not prepared to cross-
examine an expert and needed time to find his own expert. On appeal,
the court rejected his argument and observed that the district attorney
needs only to provide the information required by statute. The court
stated that because the statute does not mandate disclosure of the ca-
pacity in which a witness intends to testify or the content of the wit-
ness's testimony, defense counsel must investigate these matters
independently.74 This incomplete approach destroys, to a large extent,
the underlying purpose of rules mandating discovery of witness lists.
IV. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
Mere notice that an expert will testify, while critical to trial prepa-
ration, is insufficient. The opposing party needs to know both the sub-
stance of the expected testimony and the qualifications of the proposed
expert. The current discovery rules on scientific reports provide for
neither of these necessities. The typical laboratory report contains only
a bare conclusion. It is not unusual for the report merely to "summa-
rize[] the results of an unidentified test conducted by an anonymous
technician. ' '175
71. A few discovery rules address these problems. See, e.g., ME. R. CrM. P. 16(c)(4); MD. R.
CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 4-263(b)(4) (1990) (requiring the production of the "substance of any such
oral [expert] report and conclusion"). The Maine rule provides:
If the expert witness whom the state intends to call in any proceeding has not prepared a
report of examination or tests, the court may order that the expert prepare and the attorney
for the state serve a report stating the subject matter on which the expert is expected to
testify, the substance of the facts to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of
the expert's opinions and the grounds for each opinion.
ME. R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(4).
72. 75 Or. App. 457, 706 P.2d 1007, cert. denied, 300 Or. 451, 712 P.2d 110 (1985).
73. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.815(1) (1989).
74. Caulder, 75 Or. App. at 460, 706 P.2d at 1009; see also Knoedler v. State, 69 Md. App.
764, 768, 519 A.2d 811, 812 (1987) (holding that "[n]othing in these sections (or any other sections)
of the [discovery] Rule requires the State to categorize its proposed witnesses as expert or non-
expert").
75. United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1123 (5th Cir. 1989) (Williams, C.J., dissenting)
(concerning a hospital report on a urine test that revealed the presence of cannabinoids); see also
United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847, 848 n.3 (A.C.M.R. 1982) (explaining that "most laboratory
reports only state general conclusions").
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A. Procedures Employed
Scientific reports rarely indicate the procedure used in the analysis.
A laboratory report stating that a seized substance is "Heroin HC1''76 is
not very informative. Some types of evidence offer the analyst a choice
among a variety of testing techniques. Drug tests range from prelimi-
nary screening examinations, such as color change and microcrystal
tests, to extremely specific and sophisticated analysis, such as infrared
spectrophotometry."' Different laboratories use different protocols, and
some experts make positive identifications based only on preliminary
screening tests."8
DNA testing presents the same problems. Many laboratories per-
forming DNA analysis use different procedures. 9 The FBI, Cellmark,
and Lifecodes use RFLP analysis (restriction fragment length polymor-
phism), whereas Forensic Science Associates uses PCR (polymerase
chain reaction), a markedly different test."' Moreover, the laboratories
using RFLP use different restriction enzymes, different probes, differ-
ent matching criteria, and different statistical data bases.8 Without
this information, counsel cannot prepare adequately for trial. Not only
is most of this information not discoverable under the present rules,
these rules encourage the expert to provide as little information as
possible. s2
B. Conclusions Reached
In addition to specifying the procedure used in the analysis, the
report should set forth the expert's ultimate conclusions as well as spe-
cific test findings. With a scientific technique, such as drug testing, in
which the test findings and ultimate conclusion are the same, a problem
76. United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 525 (8th Cir. 1973)(Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs lab report), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974).
77. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14, ch. 23 (drug identification); Stein,
Laessig & Indriksons, An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic Laboratories
and the Qualifications of Their Analysts, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 727, 728.
78. One source reports: "On the basis of a test that shows only that the compound in ques-
tion is a member of a sizable class, some forensic chemists are prepared to take the stand and state
their opinion that the substance is methamphetamine (or THC, or cocaine, or whatever)." M. SAKs
& R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 18, at 7-8.
79. See Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Iden-
tification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 48-51 (1989).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. In the words of one authority: "Many criminal defense attorneys suspect that the un-
usual brevity of reports by FBI fingerprint or handwriting experts (e.g., often one or two short
sentences) may be partially explained by the fact that defense counsel is entitled to copies of them
prior to trial." Allis, Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery of the Defense Case in Federal
Courts: The Shield of Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 475 n.51 (1977).
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does not arise. In other procedures, however, the expert must extrapo-
late from the findings. In Pierce v. State,83 for example, the prosecution
expert conducted serological tests on body fluids in a rape case. Her
report, which was turned over to the defense, contained specific test
results but not her conclusion-that the rapist was a nonsecretor. On
appeal, the court ruled that the report was sufficient. The court ex-
plained that "[a]n expert's opinion of the conclusions which can be
drawn from test results in a particular case in no way alters the actual
facts of the case. Accordingly, the ultimate opinion of the expert is not
necessary for either the preparation or the presentation of the
defense. '84
This statement represents both bad science and bad law. Between
twenty and twenty-five percent of the population are nonsecretors;8 5
therefore, determining that the rapist and the defendant both fell into
this category was relevant to prove identity. 6 The defense attorney
needed to know both the specific test results and the conclusions drawn
from them to represent the accused effectively.
C. Qualifications
Background information about the expert also should be included
in the report. One court has determined that "[c]ertainly, the identity
of a particular expert witness would not be of significance." 87 To the
contrary, the credentials of the expert should be provided for two rea-
sons. First, knowledge of the expert's qualifications will help attorneys
to prepare for cross-examination, to decide whether to retain their own
expert, and to determine whether independent testing is desirable. Sec-
ond, a surprising number of expert witnesses have lied about their cre-
dentials.8 8 In one case an FBI serologist testified that he had a master's
83. 786 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
84. Id. at 1263; see also United States v. Cole, 707 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (ruling
that Rule 16 entitles the accused to the lab report but not to a "comprehensive preview of the
government's [expert] opinion testimony").
85. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14, § 17-8 at 578 (stating that a secretor
E a person whose genetic markers are secreted into body fluids other than blood-for example,
saliva and semen).
86. Pierce, 786 P.2d at 1258. The court stated that the expert "was able to determine that
the rapist was either a blood type 0 or a non-secretor. She testified that Appellant was classified as
a non-secretor." Id.
87. United States v. Holland, 884 F.2d 354, 357 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 552 (1989);
see also United States v. Krohn, 558 F.2d 390, 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 868 (1977).
88. E.g., Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058, 1062 (2d Cir. 1987) (a serologist testified falsely
about academic credentials); Kline v. State, 444 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (a psycholo-
gist testifying in the Ted Bundy trial was convicted of perjury for claiming he had a doctorate);
People v. Alfano, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1028-29, 420 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (1983) (an arson expert
testified falsely about his academic credentials); State v. Elder, 199 Kan. 607, 433 P.2d 462 (1967)
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degree in science when, in fact, he never had received a graduate de-
gree."' In another case a court vacated the death penalty after discover-
ing that a prosecution expert, who had testified in many previous cases,
had lied about her professional qualifications. The expert had failed to
complete the necessary educational requirements to become a labora-
tory technician.90 Perhaps the most striking illustration is provided by a
firearms expert who took some of the credit for "the development of
penicillin, the 'Pap' smear, and to top it all off, the atomic bomb."9' 1
Professor James Starrs, who has explored this issue in detail, has pro-
posed discovery as the remedy for this type of fraud. 2
Outright misrepresentation is not the only problem. Misleading
statements probably are more common. In the Cincinnati obscenity
trial of the Contemporary Arts Center and its director, Dennis Barrie,
for displaying some of Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs, 93 the prose-
cution's only expert witness testified that she had been employed by
the Cleveland Museum of Art from 1976 through 1978, working on
"great works of art for young people."'94 The Cleveland Museum of Art
is a world-renowned institution, a fact that an Ohio jury might know.
Accordingly, a degree of prestige accompanies this type of employment
experience. When questioned after the verdict, however, a Cleveland
Museum spokesman painted a somewhat different picture. He stated:
We virtually went back through all the payroll records we have. . . . There is no
record of her being an employee. We do know she helped in the production of a
slide tape video for a musical presentation she helped co-produce here for a few
children's classes in the early 1970s.15
D. Bases of Opinion and Number of Analysts
The expert's report also should identify all the analysts and techni-
cians involved in the testing. At one trial an expert testified that he had
(a lab technician was convicted of perjury for misrepresenting his educational background); State
v. DeFronzo, 59 Ohio Misc. 113, 116, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (C.P. Lucas County 1978) (a lab ana-
lyst pleaded guilty to eight counts of falsification for misstating his academic credentials); see also
Saks, supra note 23, at 772 (listing other cases); Annotation, Perjury or Willfully False Testimony
of Expert Witness As Basis for New Trial on Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence, 38 A.L.R.3D
812 (1971).
89. Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 460 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981).
90. Commonwealth v. Mount, 435 Pa. 419, 422, 257 A.2d 578, 579 (1969).
91. Starrs, Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists, in 2 FORENSIC SCIENCE HANDBOOK 1, 7,
20-29 (R. Saferstein ed. 1988).
92. Id. at 31.
93. See City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Center, 56 Ohio Misc. 2d 9, 264 N.E.2d 758
(Lakewood Mun. Ct. 1990); Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1990, at B1, col. 4.
94. Guenther, Witness Never on Payroll: Museum Denies It Employed Her, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Oct. 6, 1990, at A12, col. 1.
95. Id.
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performed all the electrophoresis testing in the case without any assis-
tance.9 6 Posttrial disclosure of additional documents revealed the par-
ticipation of other analysts and a discrepancy in results.9 7 Similarly, in
Reardon v. Manson 8 a toxicologist testified based on tests performed
by a chemist. He worked at a laboratory staffed by three doctorate-level
toxicologists and twenty-four chemists with lower credentials. With an
annual volume of twenty thousand tests, the toxicologists had an aver-
age of "only a few minutes per day to attend to any given test."99 Can
this limited involvement support testimony about the findings? Maybe
not, but the evidence rules permit it.
Rule 703 allows an expert to base his opinion on data that has not
been admitted at trial, provided that the data is reasonably relied on by
experts in the field. Rule 705 permits the expert to give an opinion
without first disclosing the underlying basis for that opinion. These
rules are justified because the opposing party, if it so desired, could at-
tack the basis of the opinion on cross-examination. The federal drafters
acknowledged that the viability of this justification "assumes that the
cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for effec-
tive cross-examination. . . . Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, as revised, provides for substantial discovery in this area. . .. "100
Inexplicably, the drafters failed to cite Federal Criminal Rule 16, which
does not provide for substantial discovery.
Constitutional challenges to Rule 703, for the most part, have
failed. In Reardon the Second Circuit found nothing wrong with the
toxicologist's testimony. The court held that an expert's reliance on
work conducted by others is not necessarily a violation of the confron-
tation clause if the expert "is available for questioning concerning the
nature and reasonableness of his reliance."''1 1 Significantly, the court
added that the expert's reliance is legitimate particularly when defen-
dants have access to the underlying sources of information by subpoena
or otherwise. 10 2 The discovery rules, however, do not provide this ac-
cess. Thus, counsel cannot question the reasonableness of the reliance if
unaware of it, and disclosure at trial comes too late.
96. Bretz, Scientific Evidence and the Frye Rule: The Case for a Cautious Approach, 4
COOLEY L. REv. 506, 519 (1987) (describing the facts of People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 391
N.W.2d 270 (1986)).
97. Id.
98. 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1020 (1987).
99. M. SAKS & R VAN DUIZEND, supra note 18, at 49 (discussing Reardon, 806 F.2d at 42).
100. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee note; see also Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d
784, 791-94 (10th Cir. 1980) (emphasizing the importance of discovery and Federal Rule 703), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981).
101. Reardon, 806 F.2d at 42; see also United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 355 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that "[t]he confrontation clause . . . does not forbid reliance at trial by experts
upon material prepared by others").
102. Reardon, 806 F.2d at 42.
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E. Types of Reports
A discovery rule on scientific evidence should entail disclosure of
all scientific reports. Rule 16 requires production only of reports by ex-
perts that the prosecution intends to call at trial, or reports that are
material to the preparation of the defense. Consequently, if the prose-
cution receives an expert's report but does not intend to call that expert
to the stand-the most intriguing situation from a defense perspec-
tive-the report is discoverable only if it is "material." The problem
lies not with the materiality standard, but rather with the person who
first applies that standard. Leaving the initial decision to the prosecutor
to determine "materiality" is fraught with unnecessary risks, which
often will lead to nondisclosure and needless litigation.
An analogous problem is triggered under Brady v. Maryland'"' by
a due process tenet that requires the prosecution to furnish all material
and exculpatory evidence to the defense. In United States v. Huff' 04 an
inconclusive handwriting report was deemed to be "not exculpatory,
but merely not inculpatory." Similarly, in Norris v. Slayton'05 a report
showing that hair from a rape defendant was not found at the scene of
the crime was characterized as a "neutral" report. There is no valid
reason for the prosecution to withhold such reports, and the defense is
far better equipped to determine materiality. As one court has com-
mented, "evidence such as this may, because of its neutrality, tend to
be favorable to the accused."' 06 The American Bar Association Stan-
dards and rules in other jurisdictions do not limit discovery to "mate-
rial" reports.10 7
F. Other Issues
Two other aspects of the present rules deserve mention. First, dis-
covery of scientific reports should be mandatory, as they are under Rule
16.108 A number of jurisdictions make this type of discovery discretion-
103. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
104. 473 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973).
105. 540 F.2d 1241, 1243-44 (4th Cir. 1974).
106. Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 479 (4th Cir. 1974) (concerning an FBI lab report on
shoeprint, soil sample, hair sample, murder weapon, and clothing).
107. 2 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-
2.1(a)(iv) (1986 Supp.) [hereinafter 2 ABA STANDARDS] (requiring production of "any reports or
statements made by experts in connection with the particular case"); MD. R. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. §
4-263(b)(4) (1990) (covering "all written reports or statements made in connection with the action
by each expert consulted by the State").
108. Production of scientific reports under Rule 16 was made mandatory in 1975. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee note (1975).
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ary.1 9 Second, oral as well as written reports should be discoverable." 0
This requirement prevents the lack of notice problems discussed in the
preceding section.
V. RELATED DOCUMENTS
A. Bench Notes"'
Rule 16(a)(1)(D) covers only "results or reports." Courts have used
this language to limit defense discovery. For example, in the leading
case of United States v. Iglesias"2 the prosecution produced only a lab-
oratory report stating that the substance analyzed was "54.9% pure
heroin." 1 3 The defense sought production of additional materials-log
notes, protocols, and other internal documents. Although the prosecu-
tion conceded that this material was relevant, it opposed discovery on
the ground that these documents were not a "result or report." The
Ninth Circuit agreed, even though recognizing the possibility that the
requested materials would enable Iglesias to prepare a more effective
defense." 4
The majority opinion justified its conclusion on two grounds. First,
the majority believed that the actual laboratory report adequately pro-
vided a basis for cross-examining the prosecution expert." 5 As dis-
cussed earlier, this conclusion is highly questionable. The dissent noted
that the "one line summary submitted . . . describes only the chemist's
conclusion and certainly not a detailed description of the testing.""' 6
Second, the majority concluded that log notes, unlike a final laboratory
report, "are much more likely to be distorted and misused." 1 7 The
court, however, offered no further explanation, and it is difficult to dis-
cern just how log notes could be misused.
The need to review bench notes is important in some cases. In Peo-
ple v. Young" 8 bench notes obtained after the trial showed that the
109. E.g., ARK STAT. ANN. § 43-2011.2(a)(2) (1986); IDAHO CODE § 19-1309(l)(b) (1987); Ky.
R, CRIM. P. 7.24(1)(b); NEv. R CraIM. P. 174.235(2) (1987); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 18(a)(2).
110. See supra note 71 (discussing the Maine and Maryland discovery rules).
111. Bench notes as used in this Article refer to notes taken by the analyst during examina-
tion of evidence. They include findings, calculations, and so forth.
112. 881 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1154 (1990).
113. 881 F.2d at 1521.
114. Id. at 1523-24; see also United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that a DEA chemist's work notes were not discoverable); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238
Va. 295, 303-04, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (1989) (holding that a DNA expert's work notes were not
discoverable), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1171 (1990).
115. Iglesias, 881 F.2d at 1524.
116. Id. (Boochever, J., dissenting in part).
117. Id.
118. 425 Mich. 470, 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986).
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prosecution expert, despite his testimony, was not the only analyst who
had worked on the electrophoretic testing of blood stains. 19 In addi-
tion, a discrepancy appeared in the notes, but not in the final labora-
tory report:
At the [posttrial] hearing it was established that on June 5, 1978, an electro-
phoretic run . . . indicated an EsD type of 1 for the bloodstain taken from the
porch of the victim's home. This result was followed by a question mark and the
stain was retested on June 6, 1978. At the later testing, the same stain showed an
EsD type of 2-1. Without retesting a third time, [the analyst] only reported the
latter result. Defendant's blood, tested on July 7, 1978, was an EsD type 2-1.120
The bench notes issue arises primarily because the laboratory re-
ports themselves are so deficient. Much of the material in the bench
notes should be incorporated into the report itself.12' 'Furthermore, if
comprehensive reports were required, experts like the FBI hair analyst
in Delaware v. Fensterer122 would not have to testify about their inabil-
ity to remember what method they had used in reaching their
conclusions.
The prosecution's reasons for resisting discovery in Iglesias are also
perplexing. 2 3 The question is one that permeates this entire area of
law. Pretrial disclosure of the results of a reliable test often would elim-
inate that issue at trial and might even trigger plea bargaining
negotiations. 24
119. The bench notes were produced after trial as a result of a freedom of information filing.
Bretz, supra note 96, at 519.
120. Id. (quoting Appellant's Supplemental Brief on Appeal 50, People v. Young, 425 Mich.
470, 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986)).
121. Most crime lab reports are simply not "scientific." Professor Anna Harrison of Mount
Holyoke College, during a symposium on discovery, remarked:
Then the information you are receiving is not scientific information. For a report from a
crime laboratory to be deemed competent, I think most scientists would require it to contain
a minimum of three elements: (a) a description of the analytical techniques used in the test
requested by the government or other party, (b) the quantitative or qualitative results with
any appropriate qualifications concerning the degree of certainty surrounding them, and (c)
an explanation of any necessary presumptions or inferences that were needed to reach the
conclusions.
Symposium on Science, supra note 23, at 632 (emphasis added).
122. 474 U.S. 15 (1985). The analyst testified that hair found at a murder scene had been
forcibly removed. There were three methods available to make this determination, but he could
not remember which method he had used. Id. at 16-17. The United States Supreme Court ruled
that this lack of memory did not violate Fensterer's right of confrontation. Id. at 18. Nevertheless,
on remand, the Delaware Supreme Court held the expert's opinion inadmissible on state eviden-
tiary grounds. Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106, 1109-10 (Del. 1986).
123. "In fact it is difficult to understand the government's reluctance to furnish the informa-
tion sought in this case." Iglesias, 881 F.2d at 1526 (Boochever, J., dissenting in part).
124. The Louisiana Court of Appeals took a different approach when faced with a discovery
request for notes, diagrams, printouts, and other records. According to the court: "Fundamental
fairness and due process require that the defense be given the opportunity, prior to trial, to ex-
amine the basis from which an expert reaches his conclusion." State v. Burgess, 482 So. 2d 651, 653
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
B. Graphs
Bench notes are not the only type of laboratory document that has
been sought and denied. As noted above, Wayne Williams was prose-
cuted for the deaths of two of thirty young black men who died in At-
lanta. 125 Fiber analysis was the key to the prosecution's case. One part
of the analysis employed a microspectrophotometer, an instrument
designed to measure the color of microscopic material such as fibers.126
The spectrophotometer produces a graph, and graphs of fiber taken
from Williams's car and bedroom were compared with graphs of fiber
taken from the victims.127
The defense requested production of the graphs, but the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled against discovery because the graphs were not
"scientific reports" under the discovery statute. 8 Here again, there is
no justification for withholding this type of information. The interpre-
tation of the graphs formed the basis for the expert's testimony. The
court recognized this connection, but paradoxically used it as a reason
to deny discovery. The court concluded:
After examining Dr. Peterson's testimony, it is clear that the graphs appellant
sought to exclude [as a discovery violation] did not contain the conclusions of Dr.
Peterson, but instead had to be interpreted by him in order to attain significance.
For this reason, we conclude that the graphs were not 'scientific reports' and were
not discoverable .... M
Nevertheless, thirteen graphs were admitted at trial as prosecution
exhibits.
Much of the instrumentation used in forensic analyses produces
graphs or similar printouts' 30 -for example, chromatographs, spectro-
graphs, and polygraphs. The expert's opinion is based on the interpre-
tation of the graph, and often another expert can evaluate the validity
of the findings by reviewing the graph. These graphs should be
discoverable.
(La. Ct. App. 1986); see also People v. Slowe, 125 Misc. 2d 591, 479 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Tompkins
County Ct. 1984) (holding that discovery includes lab notes and checklists formalized by protocol
or routine); 2 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 107, Standard 11-23 (stating that "[r]ough notes" may
be discoverable where relevant "to an assessment (1) of the appropriateness of the testing methods
selected, (2) of the competence of the tester, (3) of the care in the execution of the test, or (4) of
some other factor bearing on the credibility of the expert's results").
125. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
126. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14, at 1049 (discussing the use of mi-
croscopic photometry in fiber analysis).
127. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 754, 312 S.E.2d 40, 51 (1983).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14, ch. 24 (discussing instru-
mental analysis).
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C. Statistical and Novel Evidence
1. Fiber Analysis
The Williams case raises a far more serious discovery problem than
just the failure to produce the graphs. The probative force of the fiber
evidence depended on its uniqueness. As the FBI expert, Harold
Deadman, wrote in an article published after the trial, "To convey the
unusual nature of the Williams residential carpet, an attempt was made
to develop a numerical probability-something never before done in
connection with textile materials used as evidence in a criminal
trial.' 3'
At trial Deadman testified that there was a I in 7792 chance of
randomly selecting this type of bedroom carpet in Atlanta. Not satisfied
with this figure, the prosecutor added some of his own assumptions and
argued that there was only a "one in one hundred fifty million"
probability that any other Atlanta household had the same type of bed-
room and automobile floorboard carpets.3 2 In order to determine the
validity of these figures, the defense needed access to the underlying
background studies and assumptions about carpet distribution in At-
lanta. The dissenting opinion, attacking the validity of this evidence,
stated that "Deadman's mathematical calculations were particularly
worthless, in light of the fact that they were in several instances based
not only upon hearsay evidence but also upon his own unproven as-
sumptions.' 13 The rules, however, create no prosecutorial duty to no-
tify the defense before trial of this novel use of statistical evidence.
2. Neutron Activation Analysis
United States v. Stifel,"T a leading case on the admissibility of
neutron activation analysis (NAA), presents another discovery illustra-
tion. NAA is a quantitative and qualitative method for determining the
elemental composition of substances. The prosecution charged Stifel
with murdering his former girlfriend's fianc6 by sending a bomb
through the mail. Crucial prosecution evidence included activation
analysis performed on bomb debris-vinyl tape, a metal cap, a card-
board mailing tube, and a paper-gummed label-and similar items ob-
tained from Stifel's place of employment. The prosecution expert,
James Scott, testified that the label and cardboard tube were "of the
131. Deadman, Fiber Evidence, supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis added).
132. Williams, 251 Ga. at 824, 312 S.E.2d at 98 (Smith, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 825, 312 S.E.2d at 99 (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Deadman, Fiber Evidence,
supra note 3, at 13 (setting forth assumptions underlying the probability determinations).
134. 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
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same type and same manufacture.' 13 5 Scott also testified that the metal
cap and tape were "of the same manufacture" and from the "same
batch"-one day's manufacturing production.'3 The Sixth Circuit up-
held the admissibility of the NAA evidence.13 7
If NAA is used for comparative purposes, as it was in Stifel, the
matching of certain elements, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in
two samples becomes relevant only if the detected distribution of the
elements differs from samples in the general population. Any similarity
between tape recovered from the crime scene and Stifel's job is not pro-
bative if most tape is similarly composed. Consequently, additional data
is necessary to evaluate the significance of the NAA results.'38 In short,
establishing the relevance of NAA evidence, like the fiber evidence in
Williams, requires the use of statistical probabilities.'39 The back-
ground studies are critical, and testimony about "matches" and "com-
mon origin" is often misleading. 40
The defense's main attack in Stifel appears to have focused on the
general acceptance of NAA, rather than on the significance of the data
produced by this procedure. One commentator has criticized this strat-
egy for its broad-based attack on the scientific validity of NAA and has
made the following recommendation:
A better defense strategy probably would have been to stipulate to the elemen-
tal composition measurement. The jury could then have focused its attention on
what apparently should have been the primary issue, namely, the invalidity of the
expert's claims that "within a reasonable scientific certainty" the items measured
were of the same manufacture and that he had identified the metal cap and vinyl
tape fragments to within one day's production batch. No comprehensive back-
ground studies have been published on any of the materials involved in this case.
The expert was an employee of the Post Office Department Inspection Service and
the case involved the United States as a party. The Sixth Circuit opinion does not
say whether the expert attempted to substantiate his claims with purported back-
ground studies carried out in government laboratories, but the available evidence
indicates that such studies should in any event be regarded with suspicion.141
This "better defense strategy," however, would have depended on prior
135. 433 F.2d at 436.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 441.
138. Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 997,
1014 (1971). The author explained: "In neither of these cases is the NAA evidence sufficient in
itself; additional data are needed to evaluate the significance of the chemical analyses done by
neutron activation techniques .... [T]he analysis . . . depends on the existence of sufficient
background information . . . ." Id.
139. See Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F.
23, 46-47; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1329, 1342 n.40 (1971).
140. Comment, supra note 138, at 1024 (arguing that "few experts have used appropriate
care in limiting their testimony").
141. Id. at 1070-71 (footnotes omitted).
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notice that such evidence would be offered at trial and the right to re-
view the background studies before the trial commenced. Neither re-
quirement is guaranteed by Rule 16.
After his conviction, Stifel filed a request under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). The FOIA material revealed the existence of
another suspect in the bombing and discrepancies about the back-
ground tests on the vinyl tape.142 Consequently, Stifel filed a postcon-
viction petition, alleging a violation of the due process tenet of Brady.
He argued that Scott, when cross-examined, failed to disclose that addi-
tional tests had been performed on the tape. Although the court dis-
agreed that Scott had misrepresented the facts on this issue, it noted
the misleading aspect of this information in granting relief: "[H]ad the
defense known of the November 1968 tests performed by Scott on tape
obtained from Plymouth Rubber Company, it could have used this evi-
dence to further impeach the credibility of Scott's scientific
methods."'14 3
3. DNA Evidence
DNA evidence also involves statistical proof as well as other com-
plex issues. It is a novel, sophisticated technique, the validity of which
has been attacked vigorously. One scientist has questioned the assump-
tions underlying the population genetics used in DNA analysis by as-
serting that "despite . . fundamental uncertainties, forensic lab-
oratories blithely cite breathtaking frequencies: a recent report based
on the study of only four RFLPs announced that the chance of an al-
leged match occurring at random was 1 in 738,000,000,000,000."' 1"
The need for extensive discovery is self-evident.145 One court as-
12. United States v. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. 1525, 1528, 1531-38 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
143. Id. at 1542-43.
144. Lander, supra note 29, at 501.
145. In People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989), the court wrote:
The proponent, whether defense or prosecution, must give discovery to the adversary, which
must include: 1) Copies of autorads, with the opportunity to examine the originals. 2) Copies
of laboratory books. 3) Copies of quality control tests run on material utilized. 4) Copies of
reports by the testing laboratory issued to proponent. 5) A written report by the testing labo-
ratory setting forth the method used to declare a match or non-match, with actual size meas-
urements, and mean or average size measurement, if applicable, together with standard devia-
tion used. 6) A statement by the testing lab, setting forth the method used to calculate the
allele frequency in the relevant population. 7) A copy of the data pool for each loci examined.
8) A certification by the testing lab that the same rule used to declare a match was used to
determine the allele frequency in the population. 9) A statement setting forth observed con-
taminants, the reasons therefore, and tests performed to determine the origin and the results
thereof. 10) If the sample is degraded, a statement setting forth the tests performed and the
results thereof. 11) A statement setting forth any other observed defects or laboratory errors,
the reasons therefore and the results thereof. 12) Chain of custody documents.
Id. at 978-79, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
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serted that denying access to the opposing party of data relied on in
DNA testing implicates fair trial and due process concerns. 146 Yet in
United States v. Yee1 47 federal prosecutors opposed discovery of DNA
analysis performed by the FBI. The defense sought production of
matching criteria, environmental insult studies, population data, and
proficiency tests. The federal magistrate granted the motion, but based
his decision on subdivision (C) of Rule 16, which permits discovery of
documents and tangible objects that are material to the preparation of
the defense. He ruled that "predicate materials" were discoverable
under this provision. 4 The need for discovery was underscored by the
lack of "extensive independent scientific assessment and replication of
the reliability of the procedures that have been developed by the
F.B.I.,,149
The most troubling aspect of the case concerns the reason that the
prosecution opposed discovery in the first place. They simply argued
that these materials were not scientific reports under Rule
16(a)(1)(D). 150 They did not argue that the material was irrelevant or
that it would not aid in the defense. Interestingly, the day after the
discovery motion in Yee was argued, the FBI wrote a letter to the New
York Times, promoting the validity of its DNA program. The letter
stated:
The procedures employed in these tests have been carefully defined, based on ex-
tensive studies. Our procedures and test results have passed muster when subjected
to close scrutiny in the scientific community and the courts. The F.B.I. has en-
couraged wide review of the forensic use of DNA technology through sponsorship of
technical seminars and international symposiums and support to studies conducted
by the Office of Technology Assessment and the National Academy of Sciences."'
It seems incongruous to trumpet the scientific reliability of DNA in the
press and, at the same time, oppose discovery of DNA in the courtroom.
The reason for the prosecutors' conduct, of course, is tactical, a motiva-
tion that is inherent in the adversary system. Thus, the fault lies not
with the prosecutors, but with the rule.
146. See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989).
147. 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
148. Id. at 635. This holding offers a way for the defense to avoid the narrow reading of Rule
16(a)(1)(D) concerning lab reports. See United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1154 (1990). Indeed, the dissent in Iglesias raised precisely this issue. 881
F.2d at 1527 (Boochever, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
149. Yee, 129 F.R.D. at 631.
150. Id. at 630.
151. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1990, at A24, col. 4 (letter to the editor). John Hicks, Assistant
Director, FBI Laboratory Division, wrote the letter to the editor in response to an article on DNA
that appeared on January 29, 1990 and raised a number of issues concerning the reliability of DNA
testing. The FBI letter was dated February 2, 1990. The Yee discovery hearing was held on Febru-
ary 1 in Toledo, Ohio. Yee, 129 F.R.D. at 632.
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Cases like Williams, Stifel, and Yee illustrate the need for more
thorough discovery of expert information. Statistically based and tech-
nologically complex, both NAA and DNA evidence require extensive
pretrial preparation, which of necessity depends on advance and com-
plete notice.152 Yet the rules do not require adequate discovery, and
prosecutors will not always supply it voluntarily. Something is wrong
with a system in which Orville Stifel obtained greater discovery under
the FOIA after his trial than he could have received under Rule 16
prior to trial. Something is equally awry when Wayne Williams, sitting
in a penitentiary cell, can read an article about the novel fiber evidence
used to convict him, but he was not entitled to this same information
when preparing to defend himself.
VI. THE RIGHT TO TEST AND RETEST EVIDENCE
Discovery should include the right to test and retest evidence pre-
viously analyzed by prosecution experts. This right is recognized explic-
itly in the discovery rules of some jurisdictions.63 In other jurisdictions,
the right to retest is implied from discovery rules that permit the in-
spection of tangible evidence,1 54 such as Rule 16. 15 Nevertheless, recent
cases still can be found that refuse to recognize an accused's right to
retest. For example, in Frias v. State156 the defense sought to analyze
152. Commentators have written on the jury's ability to deal with statistical evidence as well
as the need for pretrial discovery in this context. Judge Weinstein has summarized several propos-
als to deal with statistical evidence, including disclosure of the underlying data and the names of
the persons who compiled the data. See Weinstein, supra note 17, at 483-84; see also MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND §§ 21.481, 33.12 (1985); THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESS-
MENTS As EVIDENCE IN COURTS 166-67 (S. Fienberg ed. 1989).
In a recent article, Professor Thompson outlined some of the problems associated with a jury's
ability to understand statistical evidence. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statisti-
cal Evidence?, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989). Some of the jury's misconceptions can be
cured through argument by counsel. This outcome is possible, however, only if counsel is ade-
quately prepared to deal with this type of evidence.
153. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West 1979) (IowA R.
CRIM. P. 13(2)(b)(1)); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 718 (West 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
903(e) (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(5) (West 1985).
154. See, e.g., James v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1972); State v. Migliore, 261
La. 722, 737, 260 So. 2d 682, 688 (1972); State v. Cloutier, 302 A.2d 84, 89 (Me. 1973); State v.
Gaddis, 530 S.W.2d 64, 69 (Tenn. 1975).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 736 F.2d 665, 666 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that
"[diefendants could have obtained their own analysis of the [cocaine] samples"), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1065 (1989); United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that "[in
cases involving a controlled substance, courts have held a concomitant part of the examination or
inspection to be the right of the accused to have an independent chemical analysis performed on
the seized substance"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981); United States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 124 (5th'Cir. 1978) (stating that the right of in-
spection "includes the right to have an expert examine the narcotics before trial").
156. 547 N.E.2d 809 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1954 (1990).
816
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
independently the cocaine exhibits used by the state at trial. The trial
court refused, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The supreme
court reasoned that the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine
the expert, had access to the laboratory reports, and had raised no ob-
jection to the accuracy of the results.15
This conclusion-that a person facing a substantial prison term for
possession of a controlled substance does not have an unquestioned
right to analyze that substance-cannot be justified. 5 " The right to re-
test is so basic that some courts have declared it constitutionally based
and a violation of fundamental fairness when denied. 5 9 Even a nonlaw-
yer, one of the pathologists who testified in the Jean Harris trial, under-
stood this point: "Should a defendant not be permitted, even
encouraged, in the spirit of truth and fairness, to have other
dermatopathologists examine those same fragments and offer their
opinions about them?' 6 0
Imbler v. Craven'61 demonstrates the value of retesting. At Imbler's
murder trial, a prosecution fingerprint expert testified that two partial
fingerprints were found on a razor case that the killer had left at the
scene. A positive identification could not be made because of the frag-
mentary nature of the prints. After the trial, a defense expert examined
the razor case and discovered a third print that could be positively
identified as not Imbler's fingerprint. 6 2 This troublesome case does not
157. 547 N.E.2d at 813. Other cases also have denied the right to retest because the defen-
dant's right to cross-examine the prosecution's experts was deemed sufficient. See People v. Ander-
son, 88 Mich. App. 513, 516-17, 276 N.W.2d 924, 926 (1979); People v. Bell, 74 Mich. App. 270, 275,
253 N.W.2d 726, 729 (1977); Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 266 Pa. Super. 442, 451-52, 405 A.2d 516,
521 (1979).
158. Courts have the authority to control the circumstances under which the retest occurs. In
State v. Faraone, 425 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1981), the court wrote:
A defendant who desires to analyze an article or substance should file a motion setting
forth the circumstances of the proposed analysis, the identity of the expert who will conduct
such analysis, his qualifications, and scientific background. The court may then, in its discre-
tion, provide for appropriate safeguards, including, where necessary, the performance of such
tests at the state laboratory under the supervision of the state's analyst.
Id. at 526.
159. The Fifth Circuit stated that "fundamental fairness is violated when a criminal defen-
dant ... is denied the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing ... examine a piece of
critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion." Barnard v. Henderson, 514
F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1975); accord White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1357 (5th Cir. 1977); Warren
v. State, 292 Ala. 71, 75, 288 So. 2d 826, 830 (1973); McNutt v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 7, 9, 648
P.2d 122, 124 (1982); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198, 200 (S.D. 1979).
160. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 46.
161. 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
865 (1970).
162. 298 F. Supp. at 809-10. After his release from prison, Imbler sued the prosecutor for
unlawful prosecution. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
prosecutorial immunity precluded recovery.
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stand alone. Other fingerprint cases,6 3 as well as decisions involving
other forensic techniques, highlight the importance of retesting. In 1989
an experienced firearms identification expert made an errofieous posi-
tive identification in a murder case. The error marked the third re-
ported mistake by the Los Angeles Police Department crime
laboratory. 164 An earlier mistake occurred in the prosecution of Sirhan
Sirhan for the assassination of Robert Kennedy. 6 The number of DNA
mistakes already reported further emphasizes the value of retesting in
these cases.' Retesting also safeguards against deliberate misrepresen-
tation-cases in which an analyst reports results of laboratory tests that
never were conducted.167
An absolute right to analyze evidence should be recognized in the
discovery rules. This right should not be conditioned on a preliminary
showing that a retest is critical'6 8 or will be favorable. 69 The defense, as
in Imbler, cannot know if the results will be favorable until after a
retest.
The right to retest in DNA cases may involve significant expense.
Because most defendants are indigent, the state would have to bear the
cost.'70 The issue of cost, however, is not new. NAA, also a complex and
costly procedure, raised similar problems. In Stifel the Sixth Circuit
163. See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982) (remarking that "[t]he
fingerprint expert's testimony was damning-and it was false").
164. See Baker & Lieberman, Faulty Ballistics in Deputy's Arrest: Eagerness to "Make"
Gun Cited in LAPD Lab Error, L.A. Times, May 22, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Freed, LAPD Probing What
Went Wrong with Ballistics Tests on Ross' Gun, L.A. Times, May 16, 1989, at 26, col. 1; see also
In re Kirschke, 53 Cal. App. 3d 405, 408, 125 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682 (1975) (finding that an expert
"negligently presented false demonstrative evidence in support of his ballistics testimony"), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976).
165. One commentator reported:
The examiners were unanimous in their findings that the identification testified to at the
grand jury indictment and in the trial were misrepresented in that the purported identifica-
tion of bullets lodged in victim Kennedy. . .with Sirhan's gun were non-existent. In both of
these cases discovery and cross-examination were lacking.
Bradford, Forensic Firearms Identification: Competence or Incompetence, 5 FORUM 14 (Jul.-Aug.
1978); see also Bradford, Problems of Ethics and Behavior in the Forensic Sciences, 21 J. FOREN-
sic Sci. 763 (1976).
166. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
167. See State v. Ruybal, 408 A.2d 1284, 1285 (Me. 1979); State v. DeFronzo, 59 Ohio Misc.
113, 118, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (C.P. Lucas County 1978).
168. See Gray v. Rowley, 604 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding an examination of semen
evidence not "critical"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 944 (1980).
169. See State v. Koennecke, 274 Or. 169, 179, 545 P.2d 127, 133 (1976) (conditioning the
right to test weapons on a preliminary showing that results will be favorable to the defendant).
170. See Comment, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 665, 701 (1989) (proposing that "[i]ndigent defendants who can demonstrate a valid
need for DNA printing services should receive them without cost"); Note, The Dark Side of DNA
Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv. 465,
523-24 (1990).
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reasoned, however, that if the government deems it necessary to use
such an expensive fact-finding procedure, then it must provide the de-
fendant adequate time to conduct similar tests and pay for these tests if
the defendant is indigent.171 The potential expense of defense testing is
unclear. It is doubtful that defense counsel routinely would make re-
quests for retesting once convinced of a procedure's reliability. Further-
more, retesting comes with a price tag. The prosecution could introduce
evidence that samples had been turned over to the defense with the
opportunity for defense retesting and then comment to the jury on the
defense's failure to introduce the test results.
VII. DUTY TO PRESERVE
The right to test necessarily implicates a duty on the part of the
state to preserve evidence for testing or retesting. A startling amount of
evidence is lost or discarded. A review of the cases reveals that drugs,
bullets, blood, urine, and trace metal detection results, as well as physi-
cal evidence of arson, rape, and homicide, have not been preserved for
examination or retesting.172 Perhaps the most bizarre illustration oc-
curred in People v. Morgan,1 3 a case in which a severed fingertip was
found at the scene of a homicide. Morgan, sans fingertip, seemed like a
good suspect and was arrested. Unfortunately, the fingertip evidence
could not be used, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, because
''someone-the police haven't been able to determine who-threw the
fingertip away.' 1 74
The Supreme Court has reviewed the preservation issue twice. In
its latest decision, Arizona v. Youngblood,175 the police in a sexual as-
sault case negligently failed to preserve semen samples from the vic-
tim's clothes and body.7 6 According to the Court, failure to preserve
171. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971).
172. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14, at 108-09 (collecting cases).
173. 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980).
174. Moya, The Case of the Missing Fingertip, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1981, at 11. The refriger-
ator where the evidence was stored apparently was not cold enough to prevent decay, and the
police refused to move it to the refrigerator where they stored their "brown bag lunches."
175. 488 U.S. 51 (1988). The Court first discussed the issue in California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479 (1984), in which the defendant challenged the State's failure to preserve an additional
breath sample in a drunk driving case. The Court rejected the argument, holding that due process
requires that the "evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Id. at 489.
176. "[B]oth a criminologist for the State and an expert witness for respondent testified as to
what might have been shown by tests performed on the samples shortly after they were gathered,
or by later tests performed on the samples from the boy's clothing had the clothing been properly
refrigerated." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 54.
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evidence is not unconstitutional unless the defendant can show that the
police acted in bad faith.177
Youngblood, however, does not answer the issue of whether discov-
ery rules should address this problem. Several jurisdictions have re-
jected the bad faith test as a matter of state constitutional law. On
remand in Youngblood, the Arizona court, applying the state due pro-
cess clause, reversed. The court explained that the semen evidence in
the case " 'is inherently evanescent, is virtually dispositive of guilt or
innocence, and collecting the evidence places only a slight burden upon
the state.' ",178 The Hawaii Supreme Court also found the bad faith test
too restrictive because it precludes courts "in cases where no bad faith
is shown, from inquiring into the favorableness of the evidence or the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of its loss.' 7 9
Moreover, Youngblood did not raise the issue of retesting evidence
that the prosecution already had examined and intended to introduce
at trial; the semen never was tested properly in the first place. 18 0 A situ-
ation in which lost evidence might be exculpatory differs from one in
which inculpatory evidence will be offered. A higher duty of care should
be required in the latter situation.
Consumptive testing, the destruction of the evidence during analy-
sis, is a frequently litigated problem of this type.' Some courts have
raised due process concerns, imposing on the state the duty to take pre-
cautionary measures to protect the defendant. In People v. Gomez, 82 a
case in which heroin residue was consumed during testing, the Colorado
Supreme Court indicated that due process might demand that the state
determine whether the defendant wants his expert to attend the testing
procedures.8 3 In a later case, People v. Garries,5 the Colorado Su-
177. Id. at 58.
178. State v. Youngblood, 164 Ariz. 61, 65, 790 P.2d 759, 763 (1989) (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing Montano v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 385, 389, 719 P.2d 271, 275 (1986)).
179. State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (Haw. 1990); see also Note, The Role of Police
Culpability in Leon and Youngblood, 76 VA. L. REV. 1213 (1990).
180. The Court's decision in Trombetta also did not involve retesting. The defendant did not
seek preservation of the breath samples actually tested by an intoxilyzer, but different samples
taken at the same time.
181. See Annotation, Consumption or Destruction of Physical Evidence Due to Testing or
Analysis by Prosecution's Expert As Warranting Suppression of Evidence or Dismissal of Case
Against Accused in State Court, 40 A.L.R. 4TH 594 (1985).
182. 198 Colo. 105, 596 P.2d 1192 (1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
183. 198 Colo. at 112, 596 P.2d at 1197.
184. 645 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1982); see also State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) (better practice), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1979); Commonwealth v. Gliniewicz,
398 Mass. 744, 749, 500 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (1986) (stating that "the defendants received no notice
of the impending tests, and thus were not able to have their own expert present to observe and
potentially to refute the subjective aspects of the [blood] testing"); State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d
170, 175 n.4 (Minn. 1978) (blood); State v. Gaddis, 530 S.W.2d 64, 69 (Tenn. 1975) (finding that
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preme Court again suppressed evidence-this time blood-
stains-because the stains were destroyed in testing. The state had
neither photographed the test results nor provided the defense with the
opportunity to have its own expert present during analysis.1 15
Consumptive testing also should be addressed in discovery rules.
An Ohio drug statute, for example, recognizes the defendant's right to
test controlled substances. If a portion of the drug cannot be preserved,
the accused has the right "to have his privately employed or court ap-
pointed analyst present at an analysis of the substance that is the basis
of the alleged violation . ,,."" This right is equally important in DNA
cases because consumptive testing is a real possibility.18 7
The right to have an expert present is an important, but neverthe-
less narrow, right. It applies only when a sufficient quantity of the evi-
dence would not remain after the initial testing. Furthermore, a
discovery rule implies that an indictment has been handed down; thus,
the right to have an expert present would not be applicable when test-
ing is done in the early stages of an investigation when a suspect may
not have been identified.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When Rule 16 was amended in 1966 to include discovery of scien-
tific reports, it appeared adequate for the task at hand. Indeed, a com-
mentator at the time wrote that the amendment assured that "to the
extent that the government utilizes modern scientific techniques for
crime detection, the findings will be available to the defendant."' 88 Re-
cent cases, however, have demonstrated the inaccuracy of this
assessment.
A. Proposed Amendments
The current discovery rules should be amended to provide the fol-
lowing: (1) notice that an expert will testify; (2) the substance and basis
of the expected testimony; and (3) the right to test and retest evidence.
This is nothing more than what Federal Civil Rule 26 already permits
"good faith demands that no [drug] test or analysis be made except by agreement between the
District Attorney and defense counsel, or until such time as defense counsel may arrange to have
his own expert present at the test").
185. Garries, 645 P.2d at 1309-10.
186. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(E) (Anderson 1987); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-
302(3)(a) (1981) (repealed 1985) (providing that "[i]f the evidence relates to scientific tests or ex-
periments, the opposing party shall, if practicable, be permitted to be present during the tests and
to inspect the results thereof").
187. See Note, supra note 170, at 524 (explaining that in the case of DNA profiling, the
prosecution's testing often will consume the entire sample).
188. Rezneck, supra note 44, at 1278.
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in civil litigation.18
The first and third objectives are addressed easily. Notification can
be accomplished by requiring disclosure of a list of expert witnesses.
The right to retest can be stated explicitly in the discovery rule.
The second objective, disclosing the substance and basis of the ex-
pert's testimony, could be achieved in several different ways. Permit-
ting discovery depositions is one solution. Although most jurisdictions
presently do not sanction this type of criminal discovery, 90 the propo-
sal is not as radical as it may appear. Many of the jurisdictions that do
not recognize discovery depositions are among the thirty-four jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 706, which
governs the appointment of court-appointed experts, contains a deposi-
tion provision.' 9' This rule could be applied to all expert witnesses. At
the very least, the trial court's authority to permit a deposition in a
particular case should be recognized.
Specifying the required contents of laboratory reports in the dis-
covery rule is another approach. 92 The procedures employed, the spe-
cific findings, the ultimate conclusions, the bases for the opinion, and
the qualifications of the expert all should be required. If a written re-
port is not prepared, then the substance of any oral report should be
produced. 193 Discovery also should extend to any related documents
used or made by experts in reaching a conclusion. This requirement
189. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Rule 26 provides in pertinent part:
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom
the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to
which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
Id. Interestingly, a number of commentators have questioned whether Rule 26 is adequate in civil
cases. See McLaughlin, Discovery and Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
760 (1988); Rothstein, The Collision Between New Discovery Amendments and Expert Testimony
Rules, 14 LITIGATION 17 (Spring 1988).
190. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
191. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (requiring that "[a] witness so appointed shall advise the parties of
the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party").
192. One court has taken this position. In United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir.
1984), the trial court ordered discovery of:
The reports of any scientific tests, examinations or experiments, or physical or mental exami-
nations, or copies thereof, including, but not limited to: (1) a statement of all material or
other information or sources considered by the examiner in arriving at an opinion, the meth-
odology used, and the findings and conclusions of the examiner, (2) a resume and curriculum
vitae of the examiner's qualifications, experience, subject matter of the examiner's testimony,
and prior occasions of testimony as an expert, and (3) any worksheets, photographs, notes, or
other things used to assist the examiner in reaching an opinion and recording the process or
methodology of reaching an opinion.
Id. at 1459-60.
193. E.g., MD. R. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 4-263(b)(4) (1991) (requiring the production of "the
substance of any such oral report and conclusion").
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should be supplemented by a right to propound interrogatories to an
expert.194 If this requirement were thought to be too burdensome, the
number of interrogatories could be limited to twenty-five.195 The pros-
pect of interrogatories may encourage experts to write more complete
reports.
These proposals are consistent with guidelines promulgated by the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors,9 6 which contain sec-
tions on casework documentation and reporting. Proper documentation
requires a system of note keeping that records the basis for any find-
ings, conclusions, and interpretations, and requires the retention of all
notes, charts, photographs, or diagrams. The guidelines advise that
"[t]he documentation should be such that a knowledgeable analyst or
supervisor, in the absence of the primary analyst, would be able to eval-
uate and interpret the data.' 197 The guidelines require laboratory re-
ports to include: (1) an accurate summary of important material
appearing in the case notes; (2) interpretive information and examina-
tion results whenever possible; and (3) identification of the analyst or
analysts and, if appropriate, the testing methodology.' 8 Moreover, the
adoption of the proposal would eliminate often-criticized reports that
keep information at a minimal level to avoid disclosing any ammunition
for cross-examination, that state findings with no accompanying inter-
pretation, and that omit significant points from a report to "trap an
unsuspecting cross-examiner. ' '199
B. Rationale
Fairness and reliability support these proposals. An accused should
not have to defend against expert testimony without the means neces-
sary to do so. Any other system is fundamentally unfair.
The reliability argument has two premises. First, full pretrial dis-
covery of scientific evidence permits the defense to challenge its validity
at trial through cross-examination or the presentation of defense ex-
perts. Second, requiring written and thorough documentation of labora-
tory tests ensures, to some extent, that proper procedures will be
followed. Analysts will know that a comprehensive, permanent record of
194. See State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824, 830 n.5 (Me. 1978) (propounding interrogatories to an
FBI expert who performed enzyme blood analysis).
195. See OHIO R Civ. P. 33(A) (requiring that "[a] party shall not propound more than forty
interrogatories to any other party without leave of court").
196. ASCLD Guidelines for Forensic Laboratory Management Practices, 14 CRIME LABORA-
TORY DIG. 39 (Apr. 1987).
197. Id. at 43.
198. Id.
199. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the Limits, 34
J. FORENSlC Sci. 719, 724 (1989).
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their work will be available to the opposing side. Currently, there are
few checks on the analyst. Most crime laboratories are unregulated and
do not participate in proficiency testing programs. Because crime labo-
ratory personnel testify only in approximately ten percent of all the
cases for which they examine evidence,2 00 the prospect of testifying at
trial is an inadequate check on unreliable work. Moreover, in most of
those cases no opposing expert testifies.20 1 Thus, comprehensive written
reports are a quality-control device.20 2 An expert who changes or modi-
fies his opinion would be required to change the report, 03 as did the
pathologist in the Jean Harris trial.20 4 He also would have to explain
the change.
Finally, comprehensive discovery eliminates subsequent litigation
over Brady issues; whether a particular test result is material or excul-
patory no longer would be an issue. The defense would have an absolute
right to know of the evidence prior to trial, and the risk that counsel
200. Peterson, supra note 57, at 45; see also Peterson, Mihajlovic & Bedrosian, supra note
54, at 15 (reporting that "on the average, crime laboratory examiners testified in 8% of drug cases
(the percentage ranged from 0 to 86%) and 10% of criminalistics cases (the percentage ranged
from 0 to 87%) where evidence was examined").
201. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 139 (1966). The authors wrote: "Again,
the imbalance between prosecution and defense appears. In 22 percent of the cases the prosecution
has the only expert witness, whereas in only 3 percent of the cases does the defense have such an
advantage." Id.; see also On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identification 49 (National Acad-
emy of Sciences 1979) (noting that a "striking fact about the trials involving voicegram evidence to
date is the very large proportion in which the only experts testifying were those called by the
state").
202. Professor Joseph Peterson has remarked:
Only a small percentage of the cases in any jurisdiction go to trial, so the technicians or
scientists in the crime laboratories seldom are called upon to justify their procedures or con-
clusions under rigorous cross-examination. I think the realization that their work will not be
reviewed-either by an independent scientist or by opposing counsel and expert in
court-decreases the care and completeness with which examiners process evidence.
Symposium on Science, supra note 23, at 643.
203. In the New York murder trial of Robert Golub, a bite mark expert made a positive
identification at trial. His pretrial report, however, stated only that the defendant's teeth were
"consistent" with the mark found on the victim. On cross-examination, the expert testified that
"his report was not meant to be his final conclusion and that he continually re-evaluated his
cases." N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1990, at B6, col. 5.
204. Dr. A. Bernard Ackerman reports:
Dr. Roh changed his opinion about the findings in the wound in the chest of Dr.
Tarnower time after time:
March 21, 1980-Autopsy report. No palmar fragments in the wound in the skin of the
chest, only "large amount of fresh hemorrhage" and "coagulation necrosis of collagen fibers."
Jan. 8, 1981-Addendum to the autopsy report. There were "three fragments of tissue in
the bullet track in the subcutaneous tissue of the chest wound" and "these tiny fragments are
. . . histologically consistent with stratum corneum, stratum lucidum, and portions of stratum
granulosum of epidermis of skin."
Ackerman, supra note 4, at 51.
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will render incompetent representation in a case involving scientific
proof thereby is reduced.
One final comment should be made. Although this Article focuses
on defense discovery, most of the same arguments apply to prosecution
discovery. The only distinction would be to limit discovery to defense
experts who will testify. This would exclude experts whom the defense
consulted but did not intend to call as witnesses. Such a limitation
would remove any possible self-incrimination, attorney-client privilege,
right to counsel, or work product issues.20 5
205. The fifth amendment is not an obstacle for two reasons. First, if the defense expert
intends to testify, discovery by the prosecutor merely accelerates the timing of disclosure. See
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970). Second, production by an expert or counsel, rather
than the accused, does not implicate the fifth amendment. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 233-34 (1975); Gipson v. State, 609 P.2d 1038, 1044 (Alaska 1980) (stating that compelled
disclosure of firearm expert's report does not violate the fifth amendment). See generally P. GIAN-
NELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 14, at 3.8; 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 15, at 525-26;
Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1569,
1655-74 (1986); Imwinkelried, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testify-
ing Experts: Reestablishing the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work
Product Protection, 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 19 (1990) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege should
not apply to most experts).
In addition, case law supports the use of nontestimonial identification procedures on less than
probable cause. Rules authorizing this practice should be adopted. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 14, § 2-4(A)(2).
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